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Abstract
As Critical National Infrastructures are becoming more vulnerable to cyber attacks, their protection becomes
a significant issue for any organization as well as a nation. Moreover, the ability to attribute is a vital element
of avoiding impunity in cyberspace. In this article, we present main threats to critical infrastructures along
with protective measures that one nation can take, and which are classified according to legal, technical,
organizational, capacity building, and cooperation aspects. Finally we provide an overview of current methods
and practices regarding cyber attribution and cyber peace keeping
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1. Introduction
Cyber security is currently one of the main concerns
for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) operators. In
fact, SCADA systems collect the data and monitor
the automation processes, which are visualized to the
operators of the system via human-to-machine interfaces.
The operators can take control of the system remotely
and issue commands such as opening a valve, setting
a temperature point or starting/stopping a pump [1].
Recently, several countries have witnessed the impact
of cyber threats to the critical infrastructures [2]. For
example, in December 2015, Ukraine was hit by massive
power outage due to an outcome of SCADA cyber
attack [3]. This caused about 230K people out of power
for several hours. Another attack that was reported
in 2016, although happened in 2013, targeted a small
dam in Rye Brook, New York [4]. Based on a joint
report by FBI and homeland security, the Wolf Creek
Nuclear Operating Cooperation was targeted [5] in 2017.
Although the nature of the attack was unknown, the
impact could go beyond any nation. Recently, UK’s
general communications head quarters (GCHQ) and
∗Corresponding author. Email: leandros.maglaras@dmu.ac.uk
National Cyber Security Centers (NCSC) are concerned
about suspicious attacks on UK energy sectors [6]. The
above are some of the examples, however, these cyber
attacks can be related to any critical infrastructure,
such as oil and gas industry, traffic signal, water sewage
building, transportation, and digital infrastructure.
It is often observed that critical national infrastruc-
tures (CNI) are controlled, even in part, by private-sector
companies. Therefore, cyber defence of any nation has to
play a significant role in privately operated networks for
the CNI. Many SCADA applications are nowadays using
common operating systems such as Windows as well
as well-known and vulnerable protocols like Transport
Control Protocol (TCP). The security vulnerabilities are
publicly available and famous events like Black Hat are
now discussing more about industrial systems, proving
that hackers are also focusing on these systems [7].
Moreover, CNIs continue to suffer information security
incidents and breaches as a result of human errors even
though humans are recognised as the weakest link with
regard to information security [8].
Lifecycle of Cybersecurity: Similar to other informa-
tion technology (IT) processes, cyber security often
follows a lifecycle model of prediction, protection, detec-
tion, and reaction. The details are discussed as follows:
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1. During the prediction phase, each organization (or
nation) needs to consider all proactive measures
to identify potential attackers along with their
intentions and the methods that they are going to
use. This step can be implemented by collecting
cyber threat intelligence and conducting risk
management [9]. Defining scope and objectives
for Risk Management, the external and internal
environment of CNIs, conducting a risk assessment
and producing appropriate risk mitigation plans
are all steps that need to be taken, following a
standardized methodology, e.g. ISO 31000.
2. During protection phase, the organization applies
hardware and software measures that are needed
in order to accomplish its security goals, following
the results of the risk assessment phase.
3. During the detection phase, the organization
needs to implement monitoring mechanisms along
with intrusion detections systems [10], which can
distinguish legitimate from abnormal behavior or
normal from malicious network traffic inside the
system.
4. The last phase of cyber security lifecycle
includes all the processes and methods that the
organization (or nation) needs to have in place
for incident notification and management, along
with appropriate mitigation, recovery, and business
continuity plans. In the core of the cyber security
lifecycle lies the cyber threat intelligence, which
is the process of collecting data and deriving
meaningful information for the system.
SCADA systems are nowadays the targets of cyber
attackers, and it is worthwhile to note that attacking
them affects a substantial number of persons, potentially
causing significant damage and ultimately threatening
human lives [11]. Post-event investigation has frequently
linked these attacks to the exploitation of vulnerabilities
deeply rooted in the ICS design philosophy which focuses
on availability rather than security.
In this article, we summarize the main issues in
regulations for cyber security and outline several aspects
of policy making to tackle cyber attacks on the CNIs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the main threats that critical infrastructures
(CI) are facing today. Section 3 presents several
measures for the protection of CI. Techniques for cyber
attack attribution are discussed in Section 4. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Threats to Critical Infrastructures
Vulnerability assessment of cybersecurity is identified by
five main phases, namely, 1) Identify the threat model, 2)
Identify possible vulnerabilities of the attack, 3) Identify
intrusion scenarios , 4) Compute scenario vulnerability,
and 5) Decision-making, as presented in Fig. 1.
Identify the threat
model
Identify the possible
vulnerabilities of the
attack
Identify intrusion 
scenario
Compute scenario
vunerability
Decision-making
Figure 1. Procedures of vulnerability assessment of
cybersecurity for critical infrastructures
In order to evaluate vulnerability indices on
cybersecurity of critical infrastructures, Ten et al. [12]
proposed two main procedures, namely, 1) cybersecurity
conditions and 2) evaluation of vulnerability indices.
The cybersecurity condition assessment is measured by
a number X, which assumes the value of 0.33, 0.67, or
1. A low value indicates that the system condition is
invulnerable, while the value 1 indicates that the system
is vulnerable. For the second procedure, the authors
proposed four steps to assess the security vulnerability,
namely, 1) identifying the intrusion scenarios; 2)
evaluating vulnerability indices for the system, intrusion
scenarios, and attack leaves; 3) port auditing; and 4)
password strength evaluation.
Threats
key-based
attacks
data-based
attacks
impersonation-
based attacks
physical-based
attacks
Figure 2. Classification of threats for SCADA system in
Smart Grids
Since we are moving to the era of IoT, there are two
categories of attacks:
• The attacks on back-end IoT devices. This category
of attacks is connected directly with critical
infrastructures. Under this category, we can find
the following attacks: attacks on SCADA systems
and attacks analysis for critical infrastructure.
• The attacks based on end-user IoT devices. This
category of attacks is not connected directly with
critical infrastructures. Under this category, we
can find the following attacks: IoT-enabled attack
vectors, IoT-enabled attacks on healthcare critical
infrastructure, IoT-enabled attacks on intelligent
2
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transportation systems, IoT-enabled attacks on 5G
cellular infrastructure.
2.1. Attacks on SCADA systems
SCADA systems and substations are now interconnected
with other systems thanks to the Power System
Communication (PSC) systems [13]. SCADA system
is the core of smart grid decision making. This
interconnection between SCADA system and smart grid
creates new possibilities and threats. Classification of
threats in smart grids is done using different criteria such
as passive or active, internal or external, etc.
In [14], authors classified threats in smart grids into
four categories, including, (1) key-based attacks, (2)
data-based attacks, (3) impersonation-based attacks,
and (4) physical-based attacks, as presented in Fig. 2. In
order to detect attacks against critical infrastructures,
Zonouz et al. [15] proposed a cyber-physical security
state estimation framework, named SCPSE, which
estimates the cyber-physical security state of a power
grid. The SCPSE framework uses stochastic information
fusion algorithms and merges sensor information from
both cyber and electrical infrastructures. By using
information provided by alerts from intrusion detection
systems, the SCPSE framework can identify malicious
measurement corruptions.
2.2. Attack analysis for critical infrastructure
Several techniques use the attack tree model to analyze
the attacks targeting the critical infrastructures, as
discussed by Fujita et al. [16]. Specifically, the authors
proposed a systemic integration of granular computing
and resilience analysis for critical infrastructures. This
resilience analysis uses three tools, namely, 1) Three-way
decisions as a tool for cognitive analysis, 2) Granular
structures based on binary relations, 3) An approach
based on the hierarchical granular modeling; and 4)
Dominance-based rough sets as a tool to understand
what are the parts of a critical infrastructure that are
not performing well.
2.3. IoT-enabled attack vectors
Modeling of IoT-enabled attack vectors against critical
infrastructures and services, as proposed by Stellios et al.
[17], contains three main entities, namely, 1) adversary,
2) IoT device, and 3) actual target.
• The adversary is characterized by the following
three capabilities: required access to the IoT,
technical skills, and required motivation.
• IoT vulnerabilities are categorized by embedded
vulnerabilities and network vulnerabilities.
• The connectivity between the IoT device and the
actual target is categorized by the following two
types: Direct connectivity with a critical system,
and indirect connectivity with a critical system.
2.4. IoT-enabled attacks on healthcare critical
infrastructure
According to Gope and Hwang [18], IoT-enabled attacks
on healthcare critical infrastructure can be classified
into three types of attack assumptions, namely, 1)
Computational capabilities, 2) Listening capabilities,
and 3) Broadcasting capabilities.
• With computational capabilities, an adversary
can launch data modification and impersonation
attacks.
• By using listening capabilities, an attacker can
perform eavesdropping and tracking of healthcare
critical infrastructure.
• Based on broadcasting capabilities, an attacker
can replay critical data of a healthcare critical
infrastructure.
2.5. IoT-enabled attacks on intelligent
transportation systems
For modeling IoT-enabled attacks on intelligent trans-
portation systems, Petit and Shladover [19]categorized
attackers in an automated vehicle system as, 1) Internal
versus external, 2) Malicious versus rational, 3) Active
versus passive, 4) Local versus extended, and 5) In-
tentional versus unintentional. For future autonomous
automated vehicles, the following attack surfaces can be
considered:
• Infrastructure sign
• Machine vision
• Global positioning system
• In-vehicle devices
• Acoustic sensors
• Radar
• Light detection and ranging
• Material/structure on which the vehicles drive
• In-vehicle sensors
• Odometric sensors
• Electronic devices
• Maps for longitudinal and lateral directions
3
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Threats
Attacks
against
authentica
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against
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Attacks
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availability
Figure 3. Classification of threats for 5G cellular
infrastructure
2.6. IoT-enabled attacks on 5G cellular
infrastructure
In general, a central base station cannot determine
the behavior of the users in 5G cellular infrastructure.
According to Geraci et al. [20], the confidential messages
in 5G cellular infrastructure can be eavesdropped by
both: (i) users in the same cell and (ii) users in other
cells.
In [21], authors classified IoT-enabled attacks on 5G
cellular infrastructure into four categories, including, (1)
attacks against privacy, (2) attacks against integrity,
(3) attacks against availability, and (4) attacks against
authentication, as presented in Fig 4. Ahmad et al.
[22, 23] in another interesting article provided an
overview of different types of IoT-enabled attacks
on 5G cellular infrastructure according to target
point/network element, which can be SDN controller-
switch communication, subscriber location, virtual
resources, hypervisor, shared cloud resources, open air
interfaces, unencrypted channels...etc.
3. Protection of Critical Information Assets
In this section, we propose some measures for the
protection of Critical Infrastructure. The measures are
divided into two main categories: cyber security measures
and cyber threat intelligence.
3.1. Cyber security measures
They are classified with respect to: legal, technical, orga-
nizational, capacity building, and cooperation aspects, as
defined by the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) [24, 25].
Protection of Critical
Information Assets
Cyber security
measures
Cyber threat
intelligence
Legal
Technical
Tactical
Technical
Organizational Operational
Capacity
building Strategic
Cooperation
Figure 4. Measures for the protection of critical
information assets
• Legal measures aim to provide legislations and
an implementable regulatory framework to protect
the cyber space. As for CI, the following good
practices can be recommended:
– Ensure mandatory periodic assessment of CIs
through information security audits
– Check the compliance of software and
hardware tools, which are used in the CI, with
recognized security standards such as: ISO
27001.
• Technical measures consider the technological
tools (software and hardware) to prevent, detect,
mitigate, and respond to cyber attacks, such as:
– Implementation of internationally recognized
security standards within organizations, espe-
cially the critical infrastructure ones.
– Implementation of preventive and detective
security tools such as: firewalls, Intrusion
Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS), Antivirus/ Anti-malware.
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– Implementation of measures for physical secu-
rity, access control, patching and upgrading,
and forensics.
– Development of an incident response capabil-
ity.
• Organizational measures are important for
the proper implementation of any type of
national initiative or policy. Under this aspect, we
recommend the following:
– Develop a national critical infrastructure
protection policy.
– Develop a national framework for the
implementation, evaluation, and maintenance
of the cyber security policies.
– Define an information security program for
organizations.
– Develop a national contingency plan.
– Identify a national agency for the implemen-
tation of the critical infrastructure protection
policy.
– Conduct a national exercise to assess the
cyber resilience of the CI.
– Conduct security audits by organizations to
check their cyber security preparedness.
• Capacity building measures aim to enhance
knowledge and know-how in order to promote
cyber security. Under this aspect, we recommend
the following:
– Encourage IT specialists in CI sectors to
be certified under internationally recognized
cyber security programs.
– Conduct periodic awareness and training
programs for employees.
• Cooperation measures aim to establish part-
nership between different stakeholders to increase
cyber resilience of the organizations against cyber
threats. Under this aspect, we recommend the
following:
– Establish trusted information sharing mecha-
nisms on threats and vulnerabilities between
private and public stakeholders
– Establish a cooperation framework between
industry and research to promote cyber
security and increase resiliency against cyber
attacks.
– Build a cooperation framework between
countries on different aspects related to cyber
security.
– Contribute in international efforts to protect
the cyber space
3.2. Cyber threat intelligence
Cyber threat intelligence refers to the collection of
inteligence before a cyber attacker targets a victim
system. The purpose is to help organizations understand
and mitigate the risks related to zero-day exploits,
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), internal and
external threat actors. This allows organizations to
adopt a proactive cybersecurity approach, and take
preventive countermeasures in advance. Inteligence can
be gathered from different sources such as: open
source intelligence (OSINT), social media intelligence
(SOCMINT), human Intelligence (HUMINT), technical
intelligence, and intelligence from the deep and dark web.
The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre
(NCSC) classifies threat intelligence into the following
four classes [26]:
• Tactical Cyber threat intelligence: This data
is obtained from real-time monitoring of systems.
It refers to real-time events and information related
to adversary’s actions inside the organization.
Tactical threat intelligence is consumed by
defenders to ensure that their incident response
systems and investigations are prepared for the
tactics.
• Technical Cyber threat intelligence: This
data is consumed through technical means, e.g.,
suspected malicious IP address. It has a short
lifetime as an adversary can for example change the
IP address. Technical threat intelligence generally
helps the the defenders to take preventive actions,
e.g., blocking the suspected IP address.
• Operational Cyber threat intelligence: This
data gives details about a specific incoming
attack such as: campaigns, malware, or cyber-
weapon tools. It gives insignts that can guide and
support the response to specific incidents, and
help assessing the ability of the organization in
determining future cyber threats·
• Strategic Cyber threat intelligence: This data
represents high-level information and a timely
warning of cyber threats, which is consumed
at the board level or by other senior decision-
makers. Strategic cyber threat intelligence forms
an overall picture of the intention and capabilities
of malicious cyber actors and their impact on high-
level business decisions.
4. Attribution of Cyber Attacks
When a cyber attack is launched against a CI, it is
likely that some real-world physical revelation will follow
[1]. In some instances this could even lead to physical
damage, injury, environmental effects or even loss of life.
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According to international or national law [27], legal
or regulatory investigation may be required, increasing
the importance of attribution artefacts. According to
NIS directive, each Member State shall designate one
or more national competent authorities for the security
of network and information systems that can take the
leading role in securing CIs. The responsible authority
of the country will have to identify whether the incident
was caused by an error in the operations, maybe a fault
component, or whether the processes or devices were
maliciously manipulated. Artefacts should be collected
and kept in a way that both authenticity, integrity and
usability are guaranteed.
Researchers have surveyed individual technical ap-
proaches to attribution, including; traceback - where the
traffic from a target device is recursively steppedback
through its routing path to its originating source, honey-
pots - where vulnerable software and services are hosted
in order to allow activities to be monitored among others.
Traceback is a class of methods that encompasses
techniques by which the traffic from a target device
is recursively stepped-back through its routing path
to its originating source device [28]. Traceback can
be supported by manual methods of traffic tracing
or logging techniques supported from network devices.
There is a third category of traceback that includes
various methods of Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM)
[29], and ICMP traceback (iTrace) [30].
Honeypots approach the issue of attribution of
attacks differently to Traceback methods. A honeypot is
a system, or set of systems, where vulnerable software
and services are hosted in order to allow activities
to be monitored and logged. Several researchers have
proposed the use of honeypots to protect important
assets of critical infrastructure [31]. However, most of
these honeypots are static systems that wait for the
attackers. In order to increase the efficiency of honeypots
they need to be as realistic as possible. In [32] authors
introduce a honeypot network traffic generator that
mimics a genuine control system in operation.
Digital Forensics is a broad subject which involves
the recovery, acquisition and investigation of digital
evidence. One technique that could be used is live
forensics where data acquisition takes place while the
system is operational. In order to avoid system crash,
especially for the SCADA systems that exist in the core
of each CI, authors in [33] propose the use of fail over
systems. In either case post incident investigator will
compete with recovery efforts, which will most likely
destroy evidence.
Network Forensics field primarily involves two
stages: collecting network messages and analyzing
network messages. An organization must identify points
in the network where they wish to collect network data.
Again special care should be given regarding SCADA
operation requirements [34].
Malware Analysis can be split into two areas:
behavioural analysis and code analysis. Behavioral
analysis examines the way that malware interacts with
the environment [35] while code analysis examines the
code that makes up the malware [36].
Measuring the performance of attribution attacks is
an open issue although several methods have been
proposed [37]. The development of modelling strategies
for evaluating cyber attacks [38] are also important.
Cook et al. [39] have used six individual metrics, as
summarized in Table 1, to measure the effectiveness of
each attribution in the context of ICS that can be applied
to CIs.
Attacks may sometimes originate from another nation
and attribution becomes a question of which country
or law enforcement agency has the responsibility and
authority to investigate, under which legal framework the
perpetrators can be prosecuted, and which laws apply.
This transnational issue was analyzed in the Tallinn
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare [40]. In the same context authors in [41] argued
that as cyber warfare becomes an increasing part of
wider conflict, peacekeeping organizations such as the
United Nations will probably need to perform cyber
peacekeeping.
In order to perform cyber peacekeping, UN or the
competent international body, should also consider peace
enforcement in order to protect civilians. While such an
event seems valuable, the feasibility is be questionable.
Research into cyber warfare [42] has shown that there
is still no answer to questions such as what constitutes
an armed attack in the cyber space or what the ethical
boundaries of cyber warfare are. In the cyber domain,
it is difficult to foresee the Security Council of th UN
agreeing to enforce peace based upon a cyber conflict
[43]. In depth study of how cyber peace enforcement
could work and the value it could bring would be useful.
A big challenge is the technical challenges CNI
presents. Facilities such as power plants and water
facilities have properties, which make observation
and monitoring more challenging than standard
network monitoring techniques [37]. The use of
proprietary protocols, air-gapping and a 24/7 availability
requirement means that monitoring of events on these
systems will require a specialised set of skills that are
in high demand globally. A discussion on how the right
expertise can be secured in the necessary numbers, and at
a price that is within an operation’s budget is a necessary
future research topic.
Multi-lateral cooperation can be used in order to
detect attacks and perform attribution, because even the
largest intelligence organizations have limited human,
technological and budgetary capacities to achieve global
coverage [44]. US has established already after World
War II the declassified 5-eyes cooperation with UK,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand and in response
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Metric Description
Performance Ability to provide attribution functions without degrading CI performance
Reliability Ability to provide attribution without affecting operating and safety processes
Extent Ability to monitor traffic to provide a full picture of network behaviour
Coherence Cross-reference traffic with device behaviours to permit inspection of command execution
Identification Ability to identify the attacker from behaviours or technical signatures
Intent Ability to determine the purpose of the attack in order to support a prosecution
Table 1. Metrics of attribution
to 9/11 a wider cooperation the 9-eyes cooperation
including Denmark, France, Netherlands and Norway
and finally the 14-eyes cooperation additionally including
Belgium, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Germany.
5. Conclusions
As CNIs are vulnerable to cyber attacks, their protection
becomes a significant issue for any nation as well as
an organization. In this article, we have summarized
the primary attributes of cyber attacks to the critical
infrastructures. We have further provided the protective
cyber security measures that one nation can take,
and which are classified according to legal, technical,
organizational, capacity building, and cooperation
aspects. Cyber threat intelligence is also an important
protection aspect as it helps taking countermeasures
in advance, and enables developing a proactive and
predictive cyber security posture. Attribution of cyber
attacks, especially when the latter originate from another
nation, is questionable regarding which country or law
enforcement agency has the authority to investigate and
prosecute the penetrators and cyber peacekeeping is
foreseen to become a reality.
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